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For centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has been used
to test the legality of restraints on a person’s freedom. The
Founders, recognizing the significance of the protection, incorporated the writ into the Suspension Clause of our Constitution. In the last century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that noncitizens may invoke the Suspension Clause.
Courts, especially in the immigration context, also expanded
the definition of “in custody” for the purpose of habeas corpus to included non-detained persons in removal proceedings. The Supreme Court has departed from such precedent
and gave new meaning to habeas corpus in the immigration
context—a major undertaking with serious consequences for
asylum seekers.
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This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam. It focuses on the Court’s departure from precedent to project
new meaning onto habeas corpus in the immigration context.
In critiquing such departure, the Comment discusses the erosion of asylum protections in the last twenty-five years. This
Comment suggests that Congress must take action to rebuild
asylum law.
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INTRODUCTION
Asylum law in the United States derives from the International
Refugee Convention and provides that any person “physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . may
apply for asylum” irrespective of the person’s status. 1 Many foreign
nationals cling to the hope that arriving in the United States will
provide them with a safe haven from persecution, torture, and potential death. 2 But for most asylum seekers, making it to the United
States marks the beginning of another tough battle against a relentless adversary: the United States immigration system. 3
United States immigration law has always been a complex and
challenging system, but since 2017, the federal government has increased its attacks on the asylum process. 4 The Trump administration issued executive orders increasing the use of expedited removal, 5 raised the threshold for credible fear interviews, 6 prolonged
the detention of asylum seekers, 7 eviscerated asylum seekers’ due

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2001).
Asylum Seekers and Refugees, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/asylum-seekers-refugees (last updated Nov. 2020).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
6
Memorandum from the Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to the Acting
Comm’r of U.S. Customs & Border Protection, et al. 8 (Feb. 20, 2017).
7
ICE launched the Family Case Management Program in 2017 to keep families seeking asylum together and out of detention. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-18-22, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT’S AWARD OF THE FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
CONTRACT 2 (2017). The Trump administration ended the program and reduced
the number of asylum seekers released on humanitarian parole in violation of
ICE’s policy directive requiring the agency to release asylum seekers who have a
sponsor and pose no risk to the community. Jane C. Timm, This Obama-Era Pilot
Program Kept Asylum-Seeking Migrant Families Together. Trump Canceled It.,
NBC NEWS (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/obama-era-pilot-program-kept-asylum-seeking-migrantfamilies-together-n885896.
1
2
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process rights, 8 implemented a “zero-tolerance” policy, 9 and enforced case quotas. 10 In addition to these attacks, the administration
also limited the availability of asylum for victims of domestic and
gang violence, 11 issued an interim final rule that banned asylum,12
implemented “Remain in Mexico,” 13 undermined the protections for
unaccompanied children seeking asylum, 14 doubled the wait time
for asylum seekers to apply for employment authorization, 15 and

In March of 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions vacated the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226,
226 (A.G. 2018). The vacatur denies asylum seekers the right to testify on their
own behalf before being denied asylum or deported. See id.; see also Matter of EF-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 324 (B.I.A. 2014).
9
Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Off. of the Att’y Gen., to Federal Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border 1 (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/press-release/file/1049751/download.
10
Joel Rose, Justice Department Rolls Out Quotas for Immigration Judges,
NPR (Apr. 3, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/justice-department-rolls-out-quotas-for-immigration-judges.
11
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018). The Biden administration moved quickly to reverse former Attorney General Sessions’ vacatur of
Matter of A-B-, concluding that rulemaking was the best way to consider the issues involved. Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307, 309 (A.G. 2021); see also
Matter of L-E-A, 28 I. & N. Dec. 304, 305 (A.G. 2021) (finding the definition of
“particular social group” would also be best addressed by issuing a final rule).
These decisions reflect the shifting nature of immigration law when left in the
hands of the executive. See infra Part IV.
12
Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661, 57,663 (Nov. 15, 2018).
13
Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to L. Francis Cissna, Dir. Of U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., et al. (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_
migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf (requiring asylum seekers trying to enter the U.S. from the southern border to wait in Mexico for court hearings).
14
Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum Division, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to All Asylum Office Staff (May 31, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/Memo_-_Updated_
Procedures_for_I-589s_Filed_by_UACs_5-31-2019.pdf. In August of 2019, the
United States District Court of Maryland issued a temporary restraining order,
enjoining USCIS from applying the memorandum. See generally J.O.P. v. U.S
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 409 F. Supp. 3d 367 (D. Md. 2019).
15
Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment Authorization for Applicants, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,532, 38,533 (Aug. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
208, 274).
8
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increased fees for asylum seekers. 16 Each of these actions was a part
of the federal government’s systematic attack on asylum, seeking to
erode asylum protections completely. 17
On June 25, 2020, the United States Supreme Court further
eroded the asylum protections afforded to noncitizens by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 18 In Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiam, the Court decided by a 7-2 vote that denials of asylum claims in expedited removal proceedings are not reviewable under the writ of habeas corpus. 19 This holding gave new
meaning to habeas corpus relief in the immigration context and departed from over 100 years of precedent. 20 That departure, coupled
with the court’s refusal to extend constitutional due process protections to asylum applicants, allows officers employed by the executive branch to make arbitrary asylum adjudications without any accountability. 21 This Article analyzes the Court’s opinion, the way it
changed habeas corpus in the immigration context, and the consequences this major undertaking will cause.
Part I outlines the history of the writ of habeas corpus (“The
Great Writ”) and its constitutional foundation. It discusses the rare
instances where the government has suspended the writ of habeas
corpus, emphasizing the extraordinary circumstances required to
justify a suspension. The section also briefly discusses legislative
limits to habeas corpus, specifically focusing on the circumstances

16
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service Fee Schedule and Changes to
Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788,
46,791 (Aug. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 106, 204, 211, 212, 214,
216, 217, 223, 235, 236, 240, 244, 245).
17
Colby Itkowitz, Trump: Congress Needs to ‘Get Rid of the Whole Asylum
System’, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2019, 4:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/trump-congress-needs-to-get-rid-of-the-whole-asylum-system/2019/04/05/700eac1a-57a5-11e9-8ef3-fbd41a2ce4d5_story.html.
18
See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963–64
(2020); see also infra notes 280–82.
19
See 140 S. Ct. at 1963–64.
20
See id. at 1993 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting the majority’s approach “flouts over a century of th[e] Court’s practice”); see also infra notes 274–
79.
21
See Gerald Neuman, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Habeas Corpus in
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, JUST SEC. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/
72104/the-supreme-courts-attack-on-habeas-corpus-in-dhs-v-thuraissigiam/.
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surrounding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996.
Part II discusses the facts, relevant law, and holding of Thuraissigiam. This section focuses on the decision’s separate opinions. It
distinguishes between the justices’ distinct framings of Thuraissigiam’s claims. Only then does it become apparent how each framing
impacts the Court’s reasoning.
Part III addresses the Court’s departure from habeas corpus
precedent in the immigration context, as well as the due process implications of the Court’s decision. This Article concludes by explaining how denying habeas review of asylum denials in expedited
removal proceedings erodes noncitizens’ right to asylum protection.
It argues that unless the Supreme Court narrows or overturns
Thuraissigiam, the current administration and Congress must act to
rebuild the asylum system, including codifying noncitizens’ rights
to habeas corpus review of asylum denials in expedited removal proceedings.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.
Origins and History of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
As early as 1215, the Magna Carta embraced the concept that no
person “shall be seized or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.” 22 However, it was not
until 1600 that English courts began considering petitions for habeas
corpus. 23 In anticipation of his brother succeeding him to the throne,
King Charles II’s Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
fearing that King James II would violate English liberties. 24 The Act
guaranteed the privilege of habeas corpus petitions and outlined the
petition’s requirements. 25 It remains in effect in England today. 26
22
Treasures in Full: Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBR. (Sept. 27, 2007, 3:20 PM),
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/academics/founders/MagnaCarta.pdf.
23
Habeas Corpus, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus (last updated June 2017).
24
Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/writ-of-habeas-corpus.html#skip_menu
(last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
25
Id.
26
Id.
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The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 influenced the framers of the
Constitution to incorporate the right of habeas corpus into the United
States Constitution. 27 Habeas corpus encompasses a variety of writs
that seek to bring a person within a court’s power. 28 The most wellknown writ is the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, also
known as "The Great Writ.” 29 The petition is used to determine
whether a person imprisoned or detained is being lawfully held. 30
The right to habeas corpus is rooted in the Constitution’s Suspension
Clause 31 and federal statutes. 32 The Suspension Clause protects the
right of the writ of habeas, preventing the federal government from
suspending the right except in cases of rebellion, invasion, or where
public safety requires it. 33 The framers, remembering their struggles
under an oppressive government, valued The Great Writ and declared that it should be suspended only under extraordinary circumstances. 34
1. SUSPENSION OF THE GREAT WRIT THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Since the Constitution’s ratification, the government has suspended the writ of habeas corpus only three times prior to Thuraissigiam. 35 The first time was during the Civil War when President
Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ throughout the Union for

27

Id.
Habeas Corpus, supra note 23.
29
Remarks on the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum, and the Practice
Connected Therewith, 4 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 259–60 (1856) [hereinafter Remarks
on the Writ of Habeas Corpus]; Ordan M. Steiker, Habeas Corpus: Origins and
History, Constitutional Protection of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Scope of
Federal Habeas Corpus (2021), https://law.jrank.org/pages/1312/Habeas-Corpus.html.
30
Remarks on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 259–60.
31
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
32
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
33
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
34
Amy Barrett & Neal K. Katyal, Common Interpretation: The Suspension
Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-i/clauses/763#:~:text=The%20Suspension%20
Clause%20protects%20liberty,the%20public%20safety%20requires%20it.
35
See id.
28
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prisoners of war, spies, traitors, or soldiers. 36 Lincoln’s decision
spurred controversy about the president’s authority to imprison people indefinitely without judicial review or authorization from Congress. 37 The debate centered on Lincoln’s authority to suspend the
writ absent congressional authorization. 38 Congress responded to
those concerns on March 3, 1863, passing the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which authorizes the president of the United States to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 39
The other instances of suspension were more geographically
limited. 40 During Reconstruction, President Ulysses S. Grant suspended the writ in nine South Carolinian counties with prevalent Ku
Klux Klan (“KKK”) activity. 41 He aimed to eliminate the KKK’s
presence and stop KKK violence. 42 Nearly seventy years later, relying on the Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, 43 the governor of Hawaii
declared martial law and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the
State. 44 Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor constituted a serious threat
to public safety, justifying the writ’s suspension. 45
Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Sept. 24, 1862), in 6 COMPILATION OF
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 98–99 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897).
37
Rufus E. Foster, The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 2 S.L.Q.
269, 271–72 (1917) (explaining that Lincoln’s issuance of the proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the entire United States was not met with
unanimous approval of jurists).
38
Id.
39
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863)
(“[D]uring the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in
his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States”); Foster, supra note 37, at 271–72.
40
See Barrett & Katyal, supra note 34.
41
See Ulysses S. Grant, A Proclamation (Oct. 17, 1871), in COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, supra note 36, at
136–38.
42
See id.; Barrett & Katyal, supra note 34.
43
“[T]he governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws
of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii within the said Territory, and
whenever it becomes necessary . . . he may, in case of rebellion or invasion, imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.” Hawaiian Organic Act, Ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141,
153 (1900).
44
See Barrett & Katyal, supra note 34.
45
See id.
36

THE
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These instances show that suspension of the writ of habeas corpus must be justified by extraordinary circumstances that jeopardize
public safety. 46 The rigor of that standard demonstrates the writ’s
importance in United States society and in protecting individual liberties; however, in the last three decades, more recent threats to public safety prompted Congress to further limit the writ’s availability. 47
2. LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS: AEDPA
On the morning of April 19, 1995, former soldier and security
guard Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including sixteen
children, and injuring hundreds more, while also destroying hundreds of nearby buildings. 48 One year later, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 49 The
Act purported “to deter terrorism” and “provide justice for victims”
of terrorism. 50 To achieve those purposes, Title I of AEDPA amends
the federal habeas corpus statute to include a one-year statute of limitations on the availability of habeas corpus relief. 51
B.
The Great Writ in Immigration
Although the writ of habeas corpus is most commonly used to
challenge the legality of criminal convictions and sentences, 52 it is
also used in the immigration context to challenge the legality of

46

See id.
See infra notes 48–51.
48
Oklahoma City Bombing, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: HIST., https://
www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited Sept. 3,
2021).
49
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104–
132, § 1, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (1996) (amended in 2016).
50
Id. at 1214.
51
“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
§ 101, 110 Stat. at 1217.
52
Jurisdiction: Habeas Corpus, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-habeas-corpus.
47
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detention and orders of deportation. 53 A petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is available to any person found to be in “custody.” 54 A detained noncitizen fits the “custody” requirement for the writ of habeas corpus. 55 But the meaning of “custody” is no longer limited to
physical detention. 56 Noncitizens filing habeas corpus petitions seek
initial review of administrative decisions. 57 In this context, no judicial proceedings have occurred, and often, no other review of the
decision is available. 58 Habeas corpus in immigration underwent
two major changes due to the passage of new legislation: the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”) 59 and the REAL ID Act of 2005. 60
1. THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996
In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA to improve the nation’s
border control. 61 Under IIRIRA, certain applicants seeking admission into the United States are subject to expedited removal. 62 Expedited removal is a process designed to speed up immigration proceedings. 63 The process grants low-level immigration officers
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS 2–4 (2008),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/lac_pa_0406.pdf [hereinafter AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO
HABEAS CORPUS].
54
Charles A. Cushman, The “Custody” Requirement for Habeas Corpus, 50
MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1970).
55
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS, supra note 53, at 3–4.
56
In the absence of physical restraint, other restrictions on liberty may satisfy
the custody requirement for habeas corpus purposes. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 437 (2004) (“[the Court’s] understanding of custody has broadened to
include restraints short of physical confinement”).
57
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS, supra note
53, at 2.
58
Id.
59
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–610 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252).
60
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310–311
(2005) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
61
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
110 Stat. at 3009-553.
62
Id. at 3009-580.
63
Id. at 3009-580–81.
53
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authority to quickly deport certain noncitizens who are either undocumented or have committed fraud or misrepresentation. 64 Immigration officials have conducted expedited removal proceedings since
2004, deporting many individuals entering without the proper documentation if apprehended within two weeks of their arrival and
within 100 miles of the northern or southern borders. 65 The use of
expedited removal saw a dramatic increase under the Trump Administration. 66
On January 25, 2017, former President Donald Trump issued an
executive order to improve border security and immigration enforcement. 67 Two years later, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) announced that it would carry out the full expansion of expedited removal. 68 This meant that, as of July 23, 2019, expedited
removal was applicable to individuals without documentation, individuals who have committed fraud or misrepresentation, and individuals who have not been physically present in the country for at
least two years prior to apprehension. 69 The executive order greatly
expanded the number of individuals subject to expedited removal. 70
When an immigration officer decides that a noncitizen is subject
to expedited removal, the government places the noncitizen in removal proceedings without allowing the noncitizen to secure an attorney or contest removal before a judge. 71 Some noncitizens
64

Id.
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,881
(Aug. 11, 2004).
66
See JOHN. F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 6 (2014), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2013.pdf; Erik Larson,
Trump Gets Path Cleared for Expedited Removal of Immigrants, DET. NEWS
(June 23, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020
/06/23/trump-gets-path-cleared-expedited-removal-immigrants/112000884/.
67
Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
68
See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48,877;
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1 (2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/primer
_on_expedited_removal.pdf [hereinafter AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON
EXPEDITED REMOVAL].
69
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 68,
at 1.
70
Id.
71
Id.
65
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subjected to expedited removal are entitled to procedural protections
before the noncitizen can be removed from the United States. 72 One
way that a noncitizen can avoid expedited removal is through a
showing of “credible fear of persecution” to an asylum officer. 73 If
the asylum officer finds that the noncitizen has a credible-fear claim,
the noncitizen is placed in formal removal proceedings, allowing the
noncitizen to pursue asylum protection. 74 Even if the officer determines otherwise, the noncitizen maintains administrative review of
the asylum claim before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). 75 These procedural protections are intended to preserve the integrity of the asylum process. 76
2. THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005
Before 2005, habeas corpus petitions in immigration fell under
two categories: challenges to the legality of removal or challenges
to detention. 77 With the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress sought to eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction over final orders
of removal, deportation, and exclusion. 78 The Act also consolidated
habeas review in the courts of appeals. 79 Nevertheless, habeas corpus remains available to challenge the length and conditions of immigration detention. 80 In the past two decades, the Supreme Court
has consistently upheld the availability of habeas corpus to bring
statutory and constitutional challenges to detention. 81
See id. at 2.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See id.
77
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS, supra note
53, at 2–4.
78
REAL ID Act of 2005 § 106 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
79
Id.
80
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS, supra note
53, at 2–4.
81
See e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688–89 (2001) (holding that
habeas corpus may be used to challenge post-removal order detention and that the
government cannot detain a removable noncitizen indefinitely); Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (finding that a noncitizen may use habeas corpus to
bring constitutional challenges to pre-removal order detention); Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371, 386–87 (2005) (extending Zadvydas v. Davis to government detention of persons found to be inadmissible).
72
73
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C.
Recent Supreme Court Precedent
Two Supreme Court decisions best exemplified the Court’s interpretation of the Suspension Clause in the immigration context
prior to Thuraissigiam: Boumediene v. Bush and INS v. St. Cyr.82
The Court distinguished Thuraissigiam from Boumediene and St.
Cyr, though the decisions represented the modern legal authority on
the Suspension Clause as applied to noncitizens. 83 An explanation
of these decisions further emphasizes the Court’s departure from
prior interpretations of habeas corpus and the Suspension Clause.
1. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH
In Boumediene, foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, sought writs of habeas corpus after being captured and designated “enemy combatants.” 84 The Court first decided whether Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”) 85 denied
federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions. 86 Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that if the statute denied jurisdiction and was valid, the Court had to dismiss the case. 87 Kennedy
found that the statute purported to preclude judicial review of habeas
actions, defining habeas actions as cases “‘which relate to . . . detention.’” 88
After establishing that the statute deprived the federal courts of
jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions, the Court then needed to
determine whether “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay could
invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause. 89 The Government
argued that “noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and detained in territory located outside our Nation’s borders have no constitutional rights and no privilege of habeas corpus.” 90 The Court
See infra notes 84–118 and accompanying text.
Id.
84
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008).
85
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2600
(2006) (“[A]uthoriz[ing] trial by military commission for violations of the law of
war . . . .”).
86
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 736.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 737 (quoting Habeas Corpus, Black’s Law Dictionary 728 (8th ed.
2004)).
89
Id. at 739.
90
Id.
82
83
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disagreed. 91 Relying on the Framers’ intent and centuries of case
law, 92 the majority held that foreign nationals detained outside of
the United States could invoke the procedural protections of habeas
corpus. 93 It established a test for determining when a petitioner may
successfully invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause. 94 The
test is comprised of two parts: (1) whether a petitioner can invoke
the Suspension Clause 95 and (2) whether the statute in question limits habeas review so far as to effectively suspend the writ as applied
to the petitioner. 96 The major takeaway from Boumediene is that the
decision reaffirmed the court’s interpretation of the Suspension
Clause in INS v. St. Cyr. 97
2. INS V. ST. CYR
Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti and lawful permanent resident
of the United States, pled guilty to selling a controlled substance in
violation of Connecticut law. 98 St. Cyr’s conviction made him deportable. 99 At the time of St. Cyr’s conviction, he would have been
eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportation by the Attorney
General. 100 The government did not initiate removal proceedings
against St. Cyr until after the passage of both AEDPA and
IIRIRA. 101 Attorney General John Ashcroft argued that the two Acts
Id. at 748 (finding that common law evidence of writ’s geographic scope
was informative but not dispositive as to whether noncitizens may invoke the
privilege of habeas corpus abroad).
92
Id. at 739.
93
Id. at 797–98.
94
See id.
95
See id. at 732 (presenting the issue of whether noncitizens detained at
Guantanamo have the constitutional privilege to invoke habeas corpus).
96
See id. at 736 (addressing whether MCA § 7 denies federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions, and therefore, effectively suspends habeas corpus actions as applied to the noncitizens detained at Guantanamo).
97
See infra notes 98–118.
98
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 293–95 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 414, § 212,
66 Stat. 163, 187 (1952)) (explaining that prior to the enactment of AEDPA and
the IIRIA in 1996, § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was
understood as granting the Attorney General the discretion to issue a waiver of
deportation of resident noncitizens).
101
Id. at 293.
91
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stripped him of the discretion to grant a waiver of deportation. 102 In
response, St. Cyr contended that the statutes’ restrictions on discretionary relief from deportation do not apply to a noncitizen who was
convicted of a deportable crime before the statutes’ enactment. 103
The Supreme Court agreed. 104
The majority held that discretionary waivers under INA Section
212(c) remained available to noncitizens who obtained convictions
through plea agreements and would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their plea. 105 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first addressed whether the Court had jurisdiction to review
St. Cyr’s habeas petition after the passage of AEDPA and
IIRIRA. 106 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
2241 107 to decide the legal issues in St. Cyr’s petition. 108 To prevail
on its claim, Stevens said, “[the INS] must overcome both the strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and
the longstanding rule requiring a clear and unambiguous statement
of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.” 109 The majority declined to interpret AEDPA and IIRIRA as stripping federal
courts of habeas jurisdiction, finding that such an interpretation
would raise serious constitutional issues under the Suspension
Clause. 110
Next, the INS argued that AEDPA and IIRIRA repealed St.
Cyr’s right to relief under former INA Section 212(c). 111 Stevens
said that for a statute to be applied retroactively, the statute’s language must require that it be applied retroactively. 112 The INS
Id. at 297.
Id. at 293.
104
Id. at 326.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 298.
107
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to grant or decline writs of habeas corpus).
108
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298. The government’s position was that AEDPA and
the IIRIRA’s amendments to the INA precluded the Supreme Court from deciding
the questions of law in St. Cyr’s habeas corpus application. Id. at 293, 298.
109
Id. at 298.
110
Id. at 300.
111
Id. at 315.
112
Id. at 315–16 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
208 (1988)).
102
103

2021]

WE'LL PROTECT YOU! OH, WAIT, BUT NOT YOU

325

argued that Congress unambiguously communicated its intent to apply the provisions of IIRIRA’s Title III-A to all removals initiated
after the statute’s effective date. 113 The Court found that Congress’s
intentions regarding the application of the “Cancellation of Removal” procedure were ambiguous. 114 The Court also concluded
that interpreting the statute to apply retroactively would impose an
impermissible effect on noncitizens who plead guilty to aggravated
felonies, forfeiting the right to trial, in reliance on the possibility of
Section 212(c) relief. 115 Therefore, the Court held that St. Cyr was
still entitled to relief under INA Section 212(c). 116
The Court’s decision in St. Cyr was consistent with its tendency
to uphold and protect habeas review, even in the immigration context. It was significant because it reinforced the critical point that
“even in the narrowest interpretations, the writ of habeas corpus at
common law . . . [did] not only apply to deportation proceedings or
solely constitutional claims,” reflecting the writ’s broad scope. 117
This precedent further exemplifies the Court’s major undertaking in
Thuraissigiam. 118
II.

DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY V. THURAISSIGIAM

A.
Background Facts
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national, fled Sri
Lanka in June of 2016 and headed for Mexico. 119 United States Border Patrol stopped Thuraissigiam only twenty-five yards from the
southern border on the United States’ side. 120 Thuraissigiam entered
without inspection (“EWI”) and did not have any of the necessary

Id. at 317.
Id. at 315.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 326.
117
Bernardo Villarreal Aguirre, Immigration and the Suspension of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, 44 T. MARSHALL. L. REV. 117, 125 (2020).
118
See infra notes 274–79 and accompanying text.
119
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2020).
120
Id.
113
114
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documentation to legally enter the country. 121 When border patrol
apprehended him, Thuraissigiam made a credible-fear claim. 122
Thuraissigiam is Tamil, an ethnic minority in Sri Lanka. 123 It is
well-documented that the Sri Lankan government routinely subjects
Tamil people to human rights violations. 124 Unfortunately, Thuraissigiam was a victim of such violations. 125 In his credible-fear claim,
he said he was afraid to return to Sri Lanka because while he was
working as a farmer, “a group of men had once abducted and severely beaten him.” 126 The group was comprised of government officials. 127 In addition to abducting and beating him, the government
officials also subjected Thuraissigiam to simulated drowning and
threatened to kill him. 128 He fled Sri Lanka to escape further persecution. 129
B.
Procedural History
An asylum officer conducted a credible-fear interview. 130 The
officer found that Thuraissigiam lacked credible fear of persecution
based on one of the required protected grounds. 131 According to the
asylum officer’s record, Thuraissigiam told the asylum officer that
he did not know who his abductors were or why they had beaten
him. 132 Thuraissigiam also told the asylum officer that he was not
afraid of being harmed because of his political opinion. 133 The officer ultimately determined that even though Thuraissigiam testified

121

Id.
Id.
123
Department of Homeland Security v. Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, AM.
C.L. UNION https://www.aclu.org/cases/department-homeland-security-v-vijaya
kumar-thuraissigiam (last updated June 25, 2020); see also Brief for Respondent
on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., v. Thuraissigiam,
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
124
AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 123.
125
Id.
126
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967.
127
AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 123.
128
Id.
129
Id; see Brief for Respondent, supra note 123, at 5.
130
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967–68.
131
Id. at 1968.
132
Id. at 1967.
133
Id.
122
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credibly, there was no nexus between the persecution and one of the
protected grounds. 134 A supervising asylum officer agreed. 135
Following the asylum officers’ denial, Thuraissigiam requested
de novo IJ review. 136 On March 17, 2007, an IJ reviewed the asylum
officer’s records and took testimony about Thuraissigiam’s background and his fear of returning to Sri Lanka. 137 The IJ agreed that
Thuraissigiam had not satisfied the nexus requirement for asylum. 138 Accordingly, the IJ affirmed the asylum officers’ decision
and returned the case to the DHS for Thuraissigiam’s removal. 139
Thuraissigiam responded by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of California,
claiming that he feared being persecuted for his Tamil ethnicity and
his political views. 140 He also contended that his “‘expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory and constitutional
rights,’” seeking vacatur of the order in addition to a “‘new, meaningful opportunity to apply for asylum and other relief from removal.’” 141 He specifically alleged that the asylum officer failed to
“‘elicit all relevant and useful information bearing on whether the
applicant has a credible fear of persecution or torture.’” 142 The petition also included allegations that both the asylum officers and IJ
applied an incorrect legal standard in making the credible-fear determination, depriving Thuraissigiam “‘of a meaningful right to apply for asylum.’” 143 The District Court for the Southern District of
California dismissed the petition, finding the court lacked jurisdiction under Section 1252(e)(2). 144
The district court held that Section 1252(e)(2) prohibited habeas
review of Thuraissigiam’s claims because the provision limited
See id. at 1967–68.
Id. at 1968.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
See id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th
Cir. 2019).
142
Id. at 1102 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)).
143
Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1102.
144
Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1082
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)).
134
135
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review to three questions: (1) whether he was an alien; (2) whether
he was “ordered removed under” Section 1225(b)(1); and (3)
whether he had been previously admitted as a lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee. 145 The court then determined that these restrictions on habeas corpus review were constitutional. 146 It found
that the restrictions did not violate the Suspension Clause because
Thuraissigiam was subject to a final order of removal under expedited removal and Section 1252(e) “retains some avenues of judicial
review” despite restricting habeas review. 147 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. 148
While the Ninth Circuit agreed that 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(e)(2)
precluded jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims, it disagreed
with the district court’s holding that the provision does not violate
the Suspension Clause as applied to Thuraissigiam. 149 Judge
Tashima, writing for a three-judge panel, applied the two-step
Boumediene test. 150 Thuraissigiam could invoke the Suspension
Clause “[b]ecause in the finality era the Court permitted even arriving noncitizens to invoke habeas review.” 151 The next step required
the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Section 1252(e) limited habeas review so far as to effectively suspend the writ as applied to
Thuraissigiam. 152 It again relied on the finality era to determine the
requirements of the Suspension Clause when a removal order is
challenged. 153 Judge Tashima addressed the balance between plenary power concerns and the protections of habeas corpus:
[B]ecause §1252(e) prevents a court from reviewing
claims of procedural error relating to a negative credible fear determination, it precludes review of the
agency’s application of relevant law and thus raises
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1083.
147
Id. at 1082 (quoting Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 2016)).
148
Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1119.
149
Id. at 1100.
150
Id. at 1106.
151
Id. at 1115.
152
Id. at 1116.
153
Id. at 1119. “Finality era” refers to the period after the Immigration Act of
1891—legislation making certain immigration decisions “final.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1975–76 (2020).
145
146
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serious Suspension Clause questions. Plenary power
concerns cannot in all circumstances overwhelm the
“fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus . . . , a right of first importance.” 154
The Court of Appeals then declined to adhere to the canon of
constitutional avoidance and interpreted Section 1252(e) to avoid
the Suspension Clause issues, concluding that the statute could not
be read to avoid the constitutional problems it created. 155
DHS filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court of the United States to answer whether Section 1252(e)(2), as
applied to Thuraissigiam, violates the Suspension Clause. 156 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held oral arguments on March
2, 2020. 157 Justice Alito, writing for a 7-2 majority, delivered the
opinion of the Court. 158
C.
The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion
From the very beginning, Justice Alito’s opinion of the IIRIRA,
specifically its provisions for expedited removal, was clear. He
claimed that the United States “lives up to its ideals and its treaty
obligations” by granting asylum to those with valid claims, which
he described as “some” of the “many.” 159 He used the same language in reference to the number of fraudulent asylum claims.160
The IIRIRA “crafted a system for weeding out patently meritless
claims and expeditiously removing the [noncitizens] making such
claims from the country.” 161 In this way, the IIRIRA represented
Congress’s judgment that such a system was necessary to avoid burdening the immigration system with the task of detaining all asylum
seekers until the removal process was completed or releasing the

Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 798 (2008)).
155
Id.
156
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161).
157
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1959.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1963.
160
Id.
161
Id.
154
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asylum seekers, presenting the risk that they would not appear for
removal proceedings. 162
Alito conceded that most credible fear screenings, nearly seventy-seven percent, resulted in a finding of credible fear. 163 Then,
he admitted that nearly half of the remainder of the total number of
screenings, approximately eleven percent, were closed for administrative reasons. 164 In some instances, the noncitizens withdrew their
claims. 165 These numbers suggest that, at a maximum, only eleven
percent of credible fear screens resulted in expedited removal. 166 He
contended that according to these numbers, most asylum seekers
who would be “subject to expedited removal do not receive expedited removal.” 167 Instead, they are afforded the same procedural
rights as other noncitizens. 168 Therefore, there is no reason to impose the burden of detaining these individuals pending full removal
proceedings on the immigration system. 169
Thuraissigiam relied on three bodies of case law to support his
claim that Section 1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause. 170
Specifically, Thuraissigiam argued that the bodies of case law show
that the Suspension Clause guarantees a broader habeas right, extending beyond a means to seek release from unlawful detention.171
First, he pointed to British and American cases decided prior to and
around the Constitution’s adoption to show that some noncitizens
used habeas to remain in the country. 172 Alito, however, argued that
the relief granted in those cases was release from detention and not
the ability to remain in the country. 173 He contended that all these
cases show is that habeas can be used to seek release from detention
in a variety of different circumstances, emphasizing that “[t]he relief
a habeas court may order and the collateral consequences of that
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id. at 1966.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1966–67.
Id. at 1971.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1974.
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relief are two entirely different things.” 174 Therefore, Alito concluded that this body of case law did not support Thuraissigiam’s
argument that the Suspension Clause guarantees a broader habeas
right. 175
The second body of case law Thuraissigiam used to support his
argument fared no better before the Court. 176 Thuraissigiam relied
on cases from the “finality era” 177 to show “the Suspension Clause
mandates a minimum level of judicial review to ensure that the Executive complies with the law in effectuating removal.” 178 The majority disagreed with this interpretation of the holdings of the “finality era” cases. 179 Justice Alito said that those decisions were not
based on the Suspension Clause. 180 Instead, they were decided based
on the habeas statute and the immigration laws of the time. 181 At the
time, the federal habeas statute was broad. 182 It authorized federal
courts to review whether a noncitizen was being held in custody in
violation of immigration law. 183 Therefore, when a noncitizen
sought a writ of habeas corpus, federal courts had to consider
whether based on the facts given by immigration authorities, detention was consistent with applicable immigration law. 184 According
to Alito, this authority was based on federal statute and not the Suspension Clause. 185 None of the “finality era” cases mention the Suspension Clause as the basis for the Court’s authority. 186 Consequently, the majority found that the “finality era” cases offered no
support for Thuraissigiam’s claim. 187
The final body of case law on which Thuraissigiam relied was
Boumediene and St. Cyr. 188 Alito dismissed Boumediene’s
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1976.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1980–81.
Id. at 1981.

332

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

relevance, claiming that the case was “not about immigration at
all.” 189 He distinguished the foreign nationals in Guantanamo Bay
from Thuraissigiam because the foreign nationals in Guantanamo
were not apprehended while crossing the border. 190 Alito also noted
that the foreign nationals in Boumediene were seeking release from
detention and not permission to enter the United States. 191 He further emphasized that the Court’s decision did not mention, or even
suggest, that the foreign nationals could have used habeas relief as
a means of gaining entry. 192 Because Thuraissigiam was seeking review of an administrative decision and not release, the majority held
that Boumediene did not support his Suspension Clause argument. 193
The majority found that St. Cyr did not help Thuraissigiam either. 194 The Court relied heavily on the statement that “because of
[the Suspension] Clause, some ‘judicial intervention in deportation
cases’ is unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’” 195 Alito did
not believe the statement did anything to support Thuraissigiam’s
claim. 196 The Court reasoned that the statement in St. Cyr did not
signify a broader habeas right, allowing noncitizens to challenge
negative asylum determinations, but instead reaffirmed that the writ
can be invoked by noncitizens held in custody pending deportation
proceedings. 197 Finding that none of the three bodies of case law
support Thuraissigiam’s claim, the Court held that Section
1252(e)(2)’s limit on judicial review does not violate the Suspension
Clause. 198
The Court then addressed Thuraissigiam’s claim that Section
1252(e)(2) violates the Due Process Clause by precluding judicial
review of his credible-fear proceeding. 199 Alito criticized the Ninth
Circuit’s holding, describing the notion that Thuraissigiam “‘had a
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 290–91).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1983.
Id.
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constitutional right to expedited removal proceedings that conformed to the dictates of due process’” 200 as “contrary to more than
a century of precedent.” 201 He said that for foreign nationals who
have neither obtained lawful admission nor acquired residence in the
United States, the decisions of executive officers acting according
to the powers given to them by Congress satisfy due process of
law. 202 Alito rejected Thuraissigiam’s argument that because he was
not apprehended the instant he tried to enter the country, he should
be afforded more rights. 203 The Court concluded that a noncitizen
who is apprehended and detained shortly after an unlawful entry
cannot be said to have entered the United States, and accordingly,
that Thuraissigiam’s only rights are those Congress provides to him
by statute. 204 Here, Thuraissigiam was entitled to a determination of
whether he had “a significant possibility” of “establish[ing] eligibility for asylum.” 205 The Court determined he was given that right,
and because the Due Process Clause required no more, Thuraissigiam was not entitled to review of the determination. 206 Thus, the
majority concluded that Section 1252(e)(2)’s preclusion of judicial
review of asylum determinations does not violate the Suspension
Clause or the Due Process Clause. 207
D.

The Concurring Opinions

1. JUSTICE THOMAS
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s holding that Thuraissigiam’s Suspension Clause argument was invalid because
Id. at 1981–82 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1111 n.15).
Id. at 1982.
202
Id. (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)); see also
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (finding that a noncitizen seeking
initial admission to the United States has no constitutional rights regarding his
application).
203
The Ninth Circuit agreed that Thuraissigiam should be treated more favorably because he made it twenty-five yards into the United States before he was
apprehended; however, the majority rejected the argument, stating the rule would
be rendered “meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving [noncitizen] set foot on U.S. soil.” Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982.
204
Id. at 1983.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
200
201
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Thuraissigiam was not seeking a writ of habeas corpus. 208 The purpose of his concurring opinion was “to address the original meaning
of the Suspension Clause.” 209 Thomas detailed the history of the writ
of habeas corpus, beginning with the purpose of the writ in the
King’s England. 210 He focused on the language of the Suspension
Clause and supposed the Clause protects a substantive right. 211 He
then asked what it means to “suspend” the writ. 212 Thomas determined that a suspension is “not necessarily an express limitation on
the availability of the writ of habeas corpus,” but rather “a grant of
power to detain based on suspicion of a crime or dangerousness
without bail or trial.” 213
According to Thomas, Section 1252(e)(2) did not invoke the
Suspension Clause because an immigration officer’s determination
of whether a noncitizen is inadmissible is based on more than mere
suspicion or dangerousness. 214 An immigration officer makes the
inadmissibility determination based on the applicant’s failure to provide valid documentation and satisfy a two-year continuous physical
presence requirement. 215 Thomas concluded that the detainee’s lack
of valid entry documents and the immigration officer’s finding that
the detainee is not eligible for asylum requires the Executive power
to have more than suspicion of a crime or dangerousness to detain a
noncitizen. 216 Thus, he claimed the “statute bears little resemblance
to a suspension as that term was understood at the founding.” 217 Applying this interpretation, Thomas concluded that 8 U.S.C. Section
1252 does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 218
2. JUSTICE BREYER
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also concurred with
the Court’s holding that the statute’s limits on habeas corpus review
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1984.
Id. at 1986–87.
Id. at 1988.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in expedited removal proceedings, as applied to Thuraissigiam, did
not violate the Suspension Clause. 219 First, Breyer pointed to the
limited amount of time Thuraissigiam spent in the United States before border patrol apprehended him. 220 He noted that Thuraissigiam
was never lawfully admitted into the United States and never lived
in the country. 221 Using these facts, Breyer distinguished Thuraissigiam’s position as materially different than that of the noncitizens
in prior cases for the purpose of the Suspension Clause. 222 He concluded that the scope of habeas review required by the Suspension
Clause, given Thuraissigiam’s position, was not as extensive as the
scope of habeas review for noncitizens who had either been admitted
or lived in the United States for a period of time before being apprehended. 223
Second, Breyer was convinced that Supreme Court precedent
demonstrates that the types of claims made by Thuraissigiam are the
type that Congress may make unreviewable in habeas corpus proceedings. 224 Thuraissigiam relied on the “finality era” cases to support his argument for a constitutional minimum.225 Breyer argued
that even accepting the argument that the “finality era” cases support
a constitutional minimum, Thuraissigiam’s claims are substantially
different than those reviewed in the “finality era.” 226 He also said
that even though Thuraissigiam’s claims were disguised as legal
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1990.
221
Id.
222
Id. (citations omitted); see Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957)
(finding that habeas corpus review of a deportation order was available to a
noncitizen who had lived in the United States for forty years); United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 261–62 (1954) (allowing a noncitizen
to attack the validity of the denial of his application for suspension of deportation
by a writ of habeas corpus where the noncitizen had resided in the United States
for over twenty years); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 137–38 (1945) (permitting habeas corpus review of a deportation order where the government initiated
deportation proceedings eighteen years after the noncitizen’s entry into the United
States); Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1934) (granting a writ of habeas
corpus to a noncitizen who was accused of prostitution, and accordingly, ordered
deported after living in the United States for twelve years).
223
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1990 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224
Id.
225
See id.
226
Id.
219
220

336

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

questions, both claims are actually “challenges to factual findings.” 227 According to Breyer, at the core of both the purported legal
challenges, there actually “lie[d] a disagreement with immigration
officials’ findings about the two brute facts underlying their credible-fear determination.” 228 These facts were the identity of Thuraissigiam’s attackers and the attackers’ motive. 229
Breyer treated Thuraissigiam’s country-conditions claim the
same. 230 He noted that Thuraissigiam did not point to evidence suggesting the immigration officials purposely disregarded facts presented to them or otherwise known to them. 231 Instead, Thuraissigiam argued that the credible-fear determination “was so egregiously wrong that immigration officials simply must not have
known about conditions in Sri Lanka.” 232 Because nothing in the
administrative record indicated an incorrect application of the law,
Breyer concluded the country conditions claim was also a factual
challenge, stating that it “boils down to a factual argument that immigration officials should have known who respondents’ attackers
were and why they attacked him.” 233 Thuraissigiam conceded that
he was not entitled to habeas review of the factual findings made by
immigration officials during his credible-fear interview. 234 Breyer
then found that Thuraissigiam’s procedural claims were also unlike
those reviewed in habeas proceedings during the finality era. 235 As
a result, neither Breyer nor Ginsburg believed Thuraissigiam’s position or habeas corpus precedent in immigration gave merit to his
Suspension Clause challenge. 236
The two justices believed the holding should be limited to the
facts of this particular case. 237 Breyer argued that the Court should
decline to go further in the future, as well. 238 He said, “[a]ddressing
227
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more broadly whether the Suspension Clause protects people challenging removal decisions may raise a host of difficult questions in
the immigration context.” 239 Consequently, according to Breyer and
Ginsburg, the Court should avoid the difficult constitutional issue,
as it had avoided the “serious and difficult constitutional issue” in
St. Cyr nearly two decades prior. 240 Thus, in their view, the Court
should hold that Section 1252(e)(2)’s limits on habeas review does
not violate the Suspension Clause based on the facts of Thuraissigiam’s case; however, the Court should not go further. 241
E.
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice
Kagan, criticized the majority for departing from years of habeas
precedent and settled constitutional law. 242 Unlike Breyer, Sotomayor believed that Thuraissigiam’s claims were indistinguishable from those before the Court in previous cases involving noncitizens seeking habeas corpus review. 243 She accused the Court of
“skew[ing] the essence” of Thuraissigiam’s claims. 244 Her framing
of the claims differed significantly from that of Justice Alito and
Justice Breyer in three important respects. 245
First, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with Justice Breyer’s contention that Thuraissigiam’s claims were challenges to factual determinations disguised as legal questions. 246 She believed the heart of
Thuraissigiam’s claim was whether he was unlawfully denied admission under governing asylum statutes and regulations. 247 This
presented a legal question of whether the immigration officials incorrectly applied the law in Thuraissigiam’s credible-fear proceedings. 248 Sotomayor found support for Thuraissigiam’s claim in the
majority’s description of Thuraissigiam’s habeas petition. 249 She
239
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noted the Court’s observation that Thuraissigiam’s petition contained factual allegations that pointed to documented persecution on
the basis of his Tamil ethnicity and his political opinion. 250 She accused the Court of refusing to admit that “its descriptions of
[Thuraissigiam’s] arguments illustrate[d] . . . claims that immigration officials legally erred in their review of his asylum application.” 251 These descriptions undermined the Court’s assertion that
Thuraissigiam’s claims had no merit beyond a mere plea to obtain
authorization to remain in the United States. 252
Second, in addressing Thuraissigiam’s procedural claims, Sotomayor said that the Court misconstrued Thuraissigiam’s procedural challenges to the expedited removal proceedings. 253 According to Sotomayor, this made a crucial difference in the Court’s analysis because “a constitutional challenge to executive detention is
just the sort of claim the common law has long recognized as cognizable in habeas.” 254 On this point, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor agreed, differing only in that Breyer and Ginsburg claimed
Thuraissigiam’s procedural challenges were not reviewable because
the claims failed to allege sufficiently serious defects. 255 Sotomayor
noted that the other justices were entitled to their conclusion about
the merits of Thuraissigiam’s procedural challenges but argued that
those conclusions should not have foreclosed Thuraissigiam’s ability to bring the challenges in the first place. 256
Lastly, unlike the majority, Sotomayor and Kagan argued that
Thuraissigiam’s request to be freed from wrongful executive custody was indistinguishable from prior cases where noncitizens challenged restraints that prevented them from entering or remaining in
the United States. 257 Sotomayor also emphasized that the Court had
never designated “release” as the only remedy of a writ of habeas
corpus. 258 Regardless, she argued, Thuraissigiam requested habeas
relief in “whatever form available and appropriate, including, but
250
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not limited to, release.” 259 Sotomayor cited Boumediene in support
of her contention that release was only one form of habeas relief and
St. Cyr for support that the writ of habeas corpus could be used to
challenge erroneous applications or interpretations of the law. 260
She concluded that even accepting the Court’s improper framing of
Thuraissigiam’s claims, the Court erred in determining that none of
the Court’s precedents supported his claim that the Suspension
Clause protected a habeas right to the type of relief that Thuraissigiam sought. 261
Sotomayor recognized that no common law habeas cases were
perfect analogs for Thuraissigiam’s case. 262 She argued that requiring a perfect analog contradicted the Court’s longstanding approach
to immigration cases. 263 In so doing, she addressed the examples in
English law, involving foreign nationals who were permitted to remain in England because of a release on habeas. 264 Justice Alito and
the majority disagreed that the foreign nationals’ ability to remain
in the country was due to writs of habeas corpus ordering their release, arguing instead that their ability to remain was a consequence
of “the existing state of the law.” 265 However, Sotomayor countered
that “[w]hat England’s immigration laws might have prescribed after the writ’s issuance did not bear on the availability of the writ as
a means to remain in the country in the first instance.” 266 She then
proceeded to cite two more classes of cases that supported the availability of habeas corpus to noncitizens who wish to remain in the
country. 267
Justice Sotomayor characterized the Court’s decision as an attempt to alleviate policy concerns. 268 She recognized that delays in
asylum adjudications were undesirable, conceding that when asylum
determinations are not timely, prolonged decision-making harms
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those eligible for protection. 269 However, she argued that Congress
and the Executive were well-equipped to alleviate the strain on the
asylum system. 270 The role of the Judiciary is simply to ensure that
the laws passed by Congress are consistent with the Constitution.271
In Thuraissigiam, the Court failed to uphold its obligation. 272 Consequently, Sotomayor dissented, disagreeing with the Court’s interpretation of the scope of The Great Writ and the reach of the Due
Process Clause. 273
III.

COMMENT ON THE THURAISSIGIAM DECISION

A.
Departure from Precedent
The Court’s decision to exclude habeas review where an asylum
seeker is denied asylum in expedited removal proceedings completely disregards centuries of governing precedent. 274 Habeas relief
extends as far back as the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 passed by
British Parliament to prevent a King from unreasonably locking up
his people. 275 In modern times, habeas petitions are mostly used to
review evidence of innocence after a criminal defendant has been
convicted. 276 And while legislation passed in 1996 and 2005 severely limited The Great Writ, 277 the Court has consistently upheld
the protections of the Suspension Clause, ensuring the constitutionality of legislation. 278 Therefore, the Court’s suspension of the writ
of habeas review in the immigration context constitutes a major departure from the writ’s history and purpose.
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The Court also departed from habeas precedent by limiting the
writ of habeas corpus to only detained noncitizens. 279 This limitation
was a major undertaking, considering the Court’s previous assertion
that its “understanding of custody has broadened to include restraints short of physical confinement . . . .” 280
B.
Consequences for Asylum Seekers
The Court’s decision in this case also denies due process protections to asylum seekers who have not yet been granted entry and
wish to challenge asylum procedures. 281 Due process protection is
crucial to the asylum-seeking process because the procedures in
place determine whether an applicant facing persecution in the applicant’s home country may seek refuge in the United States. 282 The
consequences of making a wrong determination are too severe to not
allow for review. 283
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Expedited removal raises substantial questions of due process in
itself. 284 The authority of immigration officers to initiate expedited
removal proceedings against a noncitizen is virtually unchecked. 285
As always, the burden of proof falls on the noncitizen to prove the
noncitizen is not subject to expedited removal. 286 Because the process is so short, consisting only of an interview with an inspecting
officer, there is often no opportunity for the noncitizen to speak with
an attorney or gather evidence to prevent deportation. 287
In the asylum context, the expedited process raises additional
concerns. 288 Those seeking protection often experience trauma from
either their travels to the United States or the harm they experienced
in their home country. 289 Trauma victims experience significant difficulty when trying to explain why they need protection and when
recounting important details of certain events. 290 Consequently, an
asylum officer may issue a negative credible-fear determination due
to an applicant’s failure to provide evidence. 291 Applicants who fail
to remember dates properly may even be accused of making a fraudulent claim and denied asylum where credible fear exists. 292 The
Court in Thuraissigiam leaves such applicants without a means of
judicial review, forcing them back to a home country where persecution, torture, and often, death, await them. 293
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The federal government has made numerous changes to the asylum system in the last decade, eroding asylum protections to the
point that asylum in the United States is nothing more than an illusion. 294 Both Congress and the Executive have enacted legislation, 295 executive orders, 296 and final rules that limit asylum protections. 297 Now, with the Thuraissigiam decision, the Judiciary has no
less blood on its hands. The Court failed to uphold its obligation to
ensure that Congress and the Executive act consistent with the Constitution.298 In failing to do so, the Court endangers the hundreds of
noncitizens who approach our nation’s borders, seeking refuge. 299
Former President Donald Trump called the asylum system a
scam, expressing his wish to eliminate the system completely.300
But the only scam is that the United States claims to “live up to its
ideals and its treaty obligations” 301 while expeditiously removing
noncitizens who are claiming fear of persecution, after arbitrary, unchecked decisions by low-level asylum officials. 302 Unless the Supreme Court reverses course and either narrows or overturns its
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decision in Thuraissigiam, 303 the current Biden administration304
and Congress must act to restore asylum seekers’ right to habeas
corpus review. The fate many noncitizens face upon return to their
home countries after receiving denials of their asylum applications
outweigh any potential burden on the immigration system. 305 Failure to act will endanger the lives of asylum seekers 306 and undermine the country’s adherence to its treaty obligations. 307 Out of all
the persecution, suffering, and challenges asylum seekers face, the
United States immigration system should not be their biggest adversary.
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